University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

2010

Information-Based Trade
Philip Bond
University of Pennsylvania

Hülya Eraslan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial
Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Bond, P., & Eraslan, H. (2010). Information-Based Trade. Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (5), 1675-1703.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.008

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/269
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Information-Based Trade
Abstract
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses (e.g.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982)) by allowing the final payoff of the asset
being traded to depend on an action taken by its eventual owner. We characterize conditions under which
equilibria with trade exist.

Disciplines
Economic Theory | Finance | Finance and Financial Management

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/269

Information-based trade1
Philip Bond
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Abstract
We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from
previous analyses (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz 1980 and Milgrom and Stokey 1982)
by allowing the final payoff of the asset being traded to depend on an action taken
by its eventual owner. We characterize conditions under which equilibria with trade
exist. We demonstrate that our model also applies to a portfolio allocation setting,
and relate our conditions for trade to standard measures of asset risk.
JEL codes: D8, G1.
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Introduction

Following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982), economists
have reached a consensus that under many circumstances it is impossible for an
individual to profit from superior information.1

This result is often described as

the “no trade” or “no speculation” theorem. The underlying argument is, at heart,
straightforward. If a buyer is prepared to buy an asset from a seller for price p, then
the buyer must believe that, conditional on the seller agreeing to the trade, the asset
value exceeds p in expectation. But conversely, knowing this the seller is at least as
well off keeping the asset.
This insight has had enormous consequences for financial economics. Almost all
observers of financial markets regard trade for informational reasons — informationbased trade — as a key motive for trade.

To generate information-based trade,

the vast majority of papers studying financial markets introduce “noise traders” who
trade for (typically exogenous) non-informational reasons.2 Provided strategic agents
are unable to observe the volume of noise trader activity information-based trade is
possible. However, the modeling device of noise traders has often been criticized, as is
well-illustrated by Dow and Gorton’s (2008) survey. Moreover, a significant amount
of trade takes place directly between relatively sophisticated parties — a setting that
lies outwith the standard noise-trader framework.3
1

See also Kreps (1977), Tirole (1982), Holmström and Myerson (1983) and Fudenberg and Levine

(2005).
2
See, for example, Kyle (1985), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
3
For example, many trades occur in “upstairs” markets, i.e., are trades in which “buyers and
sellers negotiate in the ‘upstairs’ trading rooms of brokerage firms” (Booth et al, 2002). Identifying
upstairs trades is relatively hard, but using detailed data from Finland Booth et al report that
upstairs trades account for 50% of total volume.

In the last few years “dark liquidity pools”

(Liquidnet and Pipeline are well-known examples) have captured a significant share of trade volume,
particularly for midcap stocks, and as is the case for upstairs markets are used only by relatively
sophisticated traders.
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In this paper we develop a distinct and hitherto neglected reason for trade between
differentially informed parties. In many cases the holder of the asset must make a
decision that affects its value.

If better information leads to superior decisions,

then the information released in trade is socially valuable. This possibility, which is
implicitly ruled out in Milgrom and Stokey’s otherwise general framework, is enough
to generate trade even without noise traders.
An example
The intuition for our results is best illustrated by an example. A risk neutral agent
(the seller ) owns an asset that he can potentially trade with a second risk neutral
agent (the buyer ). The asset’s payoff depends on two factors: an underlying but
currently unobservable fundamental θ ∈ {a, b}, and what the eventual asset owner
chooses to do with the asset. The best action for the asset owner to take depends
on θ. If θ = a the best action is A, and the asset is worth 2 if this action is taken. If
θ = b the best action is B, and the asset is worth 1 if it is taken. The asset is valueless
if any action other than the (θ-contingent) best action is taken. The buyer and seller
have the same “skill” in taking actions A and B, so that the action-contingent asset
payoffs for both parties are as given above. We discuss various interpretations below;
an immediate one is that the asset is a debt claim and the action is a restructuring
decision (e.g., liquidation vs. reorganization).
The unconditional probability of fundamental a is 1/2. Both the buyer and seller
receive partially informative signals about the true fundamental θ. Conditional on
the fundamental the signals are distributed independently and identically. Specifically, if the true fundamental is a (respectively, b) then each party observes signal sa
(respectively, sb ) with probability 3/4.
Consider the following trading game: after observing their signals, the buyer and
seller simultaneously announce whether they are prepared to trade the asset at an
2

(exogenously fixed) price p = 0.8. We claim the following is an equilibrium: the buyer
offers to buy independent of his signal, and the seller offers to sell if and only if he
observes signal sb .
First, consider the situation faced by the seller. If he ends up with the asset, he
must decide what to do using only his own information. As such, if he sees signal sa
and does not sell, his expected payoff is 3/2, while if he sees signal sb and does not
sell his expected payoff is 3/4.4 Consequently, after signal sb the seller prefers to sell
at a price p = 0.8 rather than keep the asset; and after signal sa , prefers to keep the
asset rather than sell at this price.
Next, we show the buyer is prepared to buy at price p = 0.8.

Note that in

equilibrium the buyer learns the seller’s signal when he acquires the asset, since in
equilibrium the seller only accepts the buyer’s offer when he observes signal sb . So
on the one hand, if the buyer observes signal sa he regards θ = a and θ = b as equally
likely, since he knows the seller saw sb . Consequently he will choose action A, giving
an expected payoff of 2 × 1/2 = 1. On the other hand, if the buyer observes signal
sb , then given the seller also observed signal sb the buyer’s probability assessment
that θ = b is 9/10.5

Given this, he chooses action B, yielding an expected payoff

of 1 × 9/10 = 9/10.

In both cases, the buyer’s expected payoff exceeds the price

p = 0.8. As such, the behavior described is indeed an equilibrium.
In this example both parties are strictly better off under the trade.

Moreover,

they are both better off even after conditioning on any information they acquire in
equilibrium. The reason this is possible is that the asset value endogenously depends
4

Note that since 3/4 × 1 > 1/4 × 2, action B is the better action to take if the only information

available is that one of the signals is sb .
5
Specifically, the buyer’s posterior belief is given by:
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on the information possessed by its owner. In the example, trade transfers the asset
from the seller when he observes signal sb to the buyer. Trade creates value because
it leads to a better decision after the signal pair sb sa . Specifically, after these signals
the seller would take action B because he observes only signal sb ; while the valueweighted best action is A, and the buyer takes this action. In essence, trade transfers
the asset from an agent who is likely to make the wrong decision to one who is more
likely to make the right decision. In contrast, in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and
Milgrom and Stokey (1982) asset holders have no decision to make since the final
asset payoffs are exogenous to the information possessed by its owner.
Applications
A number of different situations are captured by this model:
1. Most directly, the asset is a controlling equity stake in a firm; or (as noted
above) a debt claim that needs restructuring.
2. The asset is a large but non-controlling block of shares in a firm with an upcoming shareholder vote;6 or one of several debt claims in a firm with an upcoming
bankruptcy vote.
3. The asset is an equity or debt claim with no direct decision rights, but the holder
must still decide how to allocate the remainder of his portfolio. Specifically,
suppose now that the seller and buyer are risk averse, and that the asset’s return
distribution differs across fundamentals a and b. Depending on his beliefs about
the fundamental the asset holder chooses different portfolio allocations. Thus
6

While private benefits such as synergies can also explain trade of a controlling equity stake, this

explanation is less readily applicable in the case of non-controlling blocks. That is, while the owners
of such blocks can affect a firm’s decisions by choosing how to vote, it is less clear how they can
derive substantial private benefits (at least without engaging in self-dealing).
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in place of an action directly affecting the asset’s payoff this setting features an
action (the portfolio choice) that affects the asset holder’s utility. We return to
this application in much greater detail in Section 5 below.
Paper outline
We describe our relation to the existing literature immediately below. In Section 2
we present our general model, which closely resembles the example above but with
the binary action set and signal space replaced with an arbitrary action set and
continuous signal space. In Section 3 we derive conditions that are required for trade
to occur regardless of the trading mechanism used. In Section 4 we derive necessary
and sufficient trade conditions by studying one very simple trading mechanism. In
Section 5 we apply our results to the case in which agents trade an asset over which
they have no direct control, but instead choose portfolio allocations. We relate our
previously established trade conditions to standard measures of asset risk. Section 6
concludes.
Related literature
A number of classic papers (notably, Hirshleifer 1971) note the distinction between
information in an exchange economy and information in a production economy. However, the literature on the possibility of trade between differentially and privately
informed parties has focused almost exclusively on information in an exchange economy. In particular, the seminal papers of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Milgrom
and Stokey (1982) show that under many circumstances trade is impossible in such
an environment. Milgrom and Stokey’s “no trade” or “no speculation” result rests
on two assumptions: Pareto optimality of the initial allocation, and concordancy of
beliefs, in the sense that agents agree on how to interpret future information.

A

subsequent literature has explored conditions under which the “no trade” conclusion
5

does not hold. The literature is too large to adequately survey. Representative approaches include departing from the common prior assumption, as in Morris (1994)
and Biais and Bossaerts (1998), and thus breaking belief concordancy; departing from
Pareto optimality, as in Dow and Gorton (1995), who assume that some agents can
trade only a subset of assets; and introducing multiple trading rounds, as Grundy
and McNichols (1998)7 do when they show that both belief concordancy and Pareto
optimality may fail at the intermediate date of a three-period model.8
None of the above papers study the possibility of trade for purely informational
reasons in an economy in which asset owners must decide how to use their assets. To
the best of our knowledge the only previous consideration of this case is a chapter of
Diamond’s (1980) dissertation.9 He derives conditions under which a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) with trade exists when there are two types of agents: one
type is uninformed, while the other type observes a noisy signal. The main differences between our paper and his are that (i) we study trade between agents who both
possess information, (ii) we show that as a consequence, information is never fully
revealed, and (iii) instead of restricting attention to the competitive (REE) outcome,
in the spirit of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) we allow for all possible trading mechanisms. Moreover, Diamond’s assumption that one side of the trade is completely
uninformed means that assets always flow from the less to the more informed party.10
In contrast, when both parties to the trade have some information, assets can flow to
7
8

Related, see also Coury and Easley (2006).
One can also avoid the no-trade conclusion by using non-standard preferences: see, e.g., Halevy

(2004).
9
Less closely related is a recent working paper of Tetlock and Hahn (2007), who show that a
decision maker would be willing to trade and act as a loss-making market maker in “weather”
securities (or more generally, securities whose value is exogenous to the decision).
10
Diamond does consider an equilibrium in which uninformed agents end up holding the asset.
However, to support the equilibrium he must assume that uninformed agents learn only from the
price at which the trade takes place, and not from the volume of trade.
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the party with lower quality information.
Finally, papers such as Dow and Gorton (1997) and Guembel and Goldstein (2006)
study models in which investors trade with the understanding that the equilibrium
price affects real decisions and hence the profitability of their trades. However, these
models rely on noise-traders to generate trade, and say nothing about the possibility
of trade when there is no exogenous source of noise.
In this paper we analyze the degree to which efficiency gains arising from additional
information make information-based trade possible. However, before proceeding to
the details of our analysis, we wish to make the following clear: we are not arguing
that trade is a superior mechanism relative to other alternatives. Instead, we view
trade as a particular information-sharing mechanism that deserves focused attention:
it is widely observed, has long interested economists, and has many appealing features.

2

The model

Our model is closely related to the opening example. As in the example, there are two
risk neutral agents,11 who we refer to as a seller (agent 1) and a buyer (agent 2). The
seller owns an asset. The payoff from the asset depends on the combination of the
action taken by the asset-owner and the realization of some fundamental θ ∈ {a, b}.
Neither agent directly observes the fundamental θ, but before meeting, both agents
i = 1, 2 receive noisy and partially informative signals si . Whereas in the example
signals were binary, in our main model they have full support in R.
The eventual asset owner must decide what action to take. Regardless of whether
the asset-owner is agent 1 or 2, the range of available actions is given by a compact
set X , with a typical element denoted by X. (In the opening example, X is simply
11

Our analysis also covers the case of agents with constant absolute risk aversion preferences. We

consider this case in Section 5 below.
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the binary set {A, B}.) We write v (X, θ) for the payoff when action X is taken and
the fundamental is θ, where v (·, θ) is continuous as a function of X. We emphasize
that the asset payoff is independent of the identity of the asset-owner — both agents
1 and 2 are equally capable of executing all actions in X .
Pre-trade information
The information structure of the economy is described by a probability measure space
(Ω, F , µ), where Ω = {a, b} × R2 and F is the σ-algebra {{a} , {b} , {a, b}} × B 2.
(Throughout, we denote the Borel algebras of R and R2 by B and B 2 respectively.)
We write a typical state as ω = (θ, s1, s2 ), where θ is the fundamental, s1 is the signal
observed by the seller (agent 1) and s2 is the signal observed by the buyer (agent 2).
For i = 1, 2 and θ = a, b let η θi : B → R be the conditional distribution of si given
θ.

We write Fiθ for the associated distribution functions, and make the following

distributional assumptions. (I) The signals s1 and s2 are conditionally independent
given θ. (II) For i = 1, 2 and θ = a, b the conditional distribution ηθi has full support;
and has a density, which we denote fiθ . (III) For i = 1, 2 signal si satisfies the strict
monotone ratio likelihood property (MLRP), i.e., Li (si ) ≡

fia (si )
fib(si )

is strictly increasing

in si . Moreover, we assume that the likelihood ratio is unbounded, i.e.,
Li (si ) → 0, ∞ as si → −∞, +∞.

(1)

That is, there are extreme realizations of each agent’s signal that are very informative
— even if an agent’s signal is generally uninformative. (We stress that none of the
results of Section 3 depend on either the existence of densities or the assumption of
unbounded likelihood ratios. See also the discussion on page 15.)
Agent i directly observes only his own signal. Formally, the information of agents
i = 1, 2 before trade is given by the sub σ-algebras F1 = {a, b} × B × R and F2 =
{a, b} × R × B.
8

Trade
An allocation in our economy is a pair of mappings κ : Ω → {1, 2} and π : Ω → R
where κ specifies which agent owns the asset, and π specifies a transfer from agent 2
to agent 1. Since neither agent observes the fundamental θ both κ and π must be
measurable with respect to the σ-algebra {a, b} × B 2. Let (κ̂, π̂) denote the initial
allocation, in which agent 1 owns the asset and no transfer takes place: (κ̂, π̂) ≡ (1, 0).
A trade is an allocation (κ, π) with κ (ω) = 2 with strictly positive probability.
To rule out trades in which both parties are exactly indifferent between trading and
not trading the asset we assume that whenever the asset changes hands its final value
is reduced by δ > 0.
Post-trade information
After trade, agent i’s information is given by a σ-algebra Fiκ,π ⊂ F , where Fi ⊂
Fiκ,π ⊂ {a, b} × B 2.

That is, each agent remembers his own signal, and learns at

most the other agent’s signal.
Each agent observes the outcome of the trade, and updates his information accordingly. Formally, κ and π are Fiκ,π -measurable. Moreover, in principle it is possible
that the trade mechanism entails the release of additional information to agent i. In
this case, the σ-algebra generated by (κ, π) would be a strict sub-algebra of Fiκ,π .
An important object in our analysis is the probability that an agent attaches
to fundamental a (or b) conditional on some information. Notationally, for any σalgebra G let Q (ω; G) denote the conditional probability of {a}×R2 in state ω relative
to G.

9

Endogenous asset values
The eventual asset owner must select an action X ∈ X without knowing the realization of fundamental θ.

For each candidate action X he can evaluate the ex-

pected payoff under that action.

We denote this expected payoff by V (q; X) ≡

qv (X, a) + (1 − q) v (X, b), where q denotes the probability the agent places on fundamental a. Since the asset owner chooses the action with the highest expected
payoff, his valuation of the asset is given by
V (q) ≡ max V (q; X).
X∈X

(2)

Note that V is continuous over [0, 1], and hence bounded.12
Ex post individually rational trade
Our primary goal is to characterize when trade can — and cannot — occur for purely
informational reasons. The answer to this question clearly depends to some extent
on the institutional environment. However, it is also clear that we want our results to
be as independent as possible of a priori assumptions about the trading environment.
12

We have assumed that the fundamental θ is binary-valued. The significance of this assumption

is that it allows us to define the asset value V as a function of a one-dimensional summary statistic,
namely the probability q that the fundamental is a. That is, uncertainty is unidimensional. Unidimensionality greatly facilitates the derivation of sufficient conditions for trade in Section 4. We
conjecture the necessary conditions of Section 3 would extend to more general state spaces.
It should also be noted that it is possible to obtain a similarly tractable unidimensional framework
with a richer set of fundamentals, though at the cost of introducing more assumptions on the asset
payoff functions v (X, θ). For example, one could allow the fundamental θ to be drawn from an
arbitrary subset of R, but restrict the asset payoff to take the form v (X, θ) = K (X) + M (X) θ for
an arbitrary pair of continuous functions K and M . In this case, the expected asset payoff given
action X is a linear function of the expected value of θ, and so one can define an analogous function
to V that depends only on a one-dimensional variable (i.e., the expected value of θ as opposed to
the probability of a).
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To meet these objectives, we begin by establishing necessary conditions for trade
to occur in a very wide class of trading mechanisms. The only condition we impose
is that trades must be ex post individually rational.

That is, both agents 1 and 2

must prefer the post-trade outcome to the original allocation (in which agent 1 owns
the asset), even after conditioning on the information they acquire in equilibrium.
This condition must be met state-by-state.
reasons.

We adopt this requirement for two

First, it is a demanding condition to satisfy, and so biases our analysis

against generating trade. Second, it is used in many prior analyses. In particular,
it is equivalent to Milgrom and Stokey’s (1982) requirement of common knowledge of
gains from trade;13 and is part of the definition of a rational expectations equilibrium.
Formally, a trade (κ, π) is ex post individually rational (IR) if
π (ω) ≥ V (Q (ω; F1κ,π ))
V (Q (ω; F2κ,π )) − δ − π (ω) ≥ 0

(3)
(4)

almost always when the buyer gets the asset, i.e., for almost all ω such that κ (ω) = 2.
Note that the information used by agent i to evaluate the trade is Fiκ,π , i.e., the
information of agent i after trade. The analogous conditions for states ω in which
no trade occurs are that π (ω) ≥ 0 and 0 ≥ π (ω) almost always when the seller keeps
the asset, i.e., κ (ω) = 1. It follows trivially that ex post IR implies that no money
changes hands in almost all states ω in which the seller keeps the asset, i.e., π (ω) = 0
when κ (ω) = 1.
For any allocation let ΩT denote the states in which the buyer acquires the asset
13

In Milgrom and Stokey, agent i evaluates the trade according to “his information at the time of

trading, including whatever he can infer from prices or from the behavior of other traders” (page 19).
We take this information to include at least the information revealed by the post-trade allocation.
In Milgrom and Stokey’s framework, there would still be no trade even if one instead assumed that
agent i possessed coarser information. In contrast, in our model coarsening the information that
agent i uses to evaluate trade affects trade opportunities.
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(i.e., κ (ω) = 2) and the ex post IR conditions (3) and (4) hold. Note that µ ΩT > 0
in any ex post IR trade.

Pareto optimality of the original allocation
Milgrom and Stokey’s “no speculation” theorem establishes that trade cannot occur
purely for information-based reasons. Of course, this in no way affects the possibility
of trade for risk-sharing reasons. As such, Milgrom and Stokey’s result is predicated
on the Pareto optimality of the pre-trade state-contingent allocation.
In our setting, both agents are risk neutral, and are equally capable of executing
any action X ∈ X . As such, the only possible motivation for trade is the differential
information of the two parties. Formally, since risk-sharing motivations are absent,
any state-contingent allocation is Pareto optimal. Of course, this ignores the fact that
agents 1 and 2 potentially have different information, and so take different actions.
However, trade motivated by such considerations is precisely information-based trade,
and is the main object of our analysis.

3

Necessary conditions for trade

In this section we establish necessary conditions for trade to take place, all of which
must hold regardless of the trading mechanism employed. First:
Proposition 1. No ex post IR trade exists if V is monotone.
All proofs are in the appendix. The intuition is most easily understood by considering again the opening example, which is displayed graphically in Figure 1. Recall
that in the example trade occurs whenever the seller sees signal sb . The buyer’s valuation when trade occurs is driven by the probability he places on fundamental a, i.e.,


Pr a|sb sa or Pr a|sb sb , depending on his own signal realization. Trade is possible
12

V (q; A)

V (sa )

V sb sa




V sb sb

V sb
V (q; B)
Pr a|sb sb



Pr a|s

Pr a|sbsa

b



Pr (a|sa)

Pr (a|·)

Figure 1: The graph displays V (q; X) for the opening example: the action set is

X = {A, B} and both the buyer and seller observe signals drawn from sa , sb . The

bold line is the upper envelope of these two functions, and corresponds to the function
V (q).
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because the value of the asset given these probabilities exceeds the value of the asset

when the probability of fundamental a is Pr a|sb , which is the information the seller



has. Since Pr a|sb sa > Pr a|sb > Pr a|sbsb , trade is clearly only possible in this
example if V is non-monotone. Proposition 1 extends this observation to our main

model, and to any trading mechanism.
As an immediate corollary of Proposition 1 we obtain:
Corollary 1. Trade is possible only if (i) there is no dominant action, i.e., @X ∈ X
such that v (X, θ) ≥ v (X 0 , θ) for all X 0 6= X and θ = a, b; and (ii) there is no
dominant fundamental, i.e., @θ ∈ {a, b} such that v (X, θ) ≥ v (X, θ 0) for all X ∈ X
and θ0 6= θ.
A second key property of the trade equilibrium in the opening example is that
the buyer learns the seller’s signal when trade occurs. The fact that the buyer learns
everything about the seller’s signal is an artifact of the binary nature of signals in
the example. In general, however, a necessary condition for trade is that the buyer
learns something about the seller’s signal when trade occurs:
Proposition 2. There is no ex post IR trade in which the buyer learns nothing
whenever he acquires the asset.
Proposition 2 says that trade is not possible if it does not convey some information to the buyer. This conclusion is very much in line with the existing no-trade
literature. At the same time, and as our opening example makes clear, trade is at
least sometimes possible if it enables the buyer to learn the seller’s signal.
To understand Proposition 2, it again helps to reconsider the opening example.
Suppose that trade occurred in this example without the buyer learning anything
about the seller’s signal. For specificity, suppose further that trade only occurs when
the buyer sees signal sa .14 Recall that agents always learn at least the information
14

Similiar arguments apply for the cases of trade following signal sb , and trade after both buyer

14

revealed by the trade allocation. Consequently, for the buyer not to learn anything
trade must occur after both signal pairs sasa and sb sa . So when trade occurs, the
buyer places probability Pr (a|sa ) on the fundamental being a; while the seller places

probability Pr (a|sasa ) or Pr a|sbsa on the fundamental being a, depending on his
own signal realization.

To see why this information is inconsistent with trade, look again at Figure 1. The
asset value V is single-troughed as a function of the probability q of fundamental a.
Since the buyer does not learn the seller’s signal, at one state in which trade occurs
the seller places a higher probability on fundamental a than does the buyer, while
in another state the seller places a lower probability on fundamental a. Specifically,

Pr (a|sa sa) > Pr (a|sa) > Pr a|sbsa . Given the shape of V it follows that at least

one of V (Pr (a|sasa )) and V Pr a|sb sa exceeds V (Pr (a|sa)). But in words, this

comparison says that at at least one of sasa and sb sa the seller’s valuation exceeds
the buyer’s valuation — contradicting the trade conditions.
The key step in this argument is the shape of the V function.

Since V is the

upper envelope of functions V (q; X), each of which is linear, V itself is convex. An
immediate consequence is:
Lemma 1. V is a single-troughed function.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows from the shape of V , and is along the same lines
as the above discussion of the example. The main complication in the formal proof
is the need to form conditional probabilities for arbitrary information possessed by
the seller. At the same time, the proof is simplified somewhat by our assumption of
unbounded likelihood ratios (see (1)). We emphasize, however, that (as the example
illustrates) this property is not essential for the result, and a proof for the case of
bounded likelihood ratios is contained in an earlier working paper.
signal realizations.

15

For our next two results, it is useful to separate the benefits and costs of trade.
Ex post IR implies
Z

(V (Q (ω; F2κ,π )) − V (Q (ω; F1κ,π ))) µ (dω) ≥ µ ΩT δ.

(5)

ΩT

The lefthand side is the benefit of trade. Since the buyer’s information in state ω
is different from the seller’s, he potentially takes a different action. This causes the
value of the asset when owned by the buyer to potentially diverge from the value
of the asset owned by the seller, in spite of their equal ability to execute all actions
X ∈ X . The righthand side is the direct cost of trade, i.e., the trade cost δ multiplied
by the probability of trade occurring.
An almost immediate consequence of (5) is:
Proposition 3. Suppose an ex post IR trade exists. Then there exists a non-null
subset of the trade set ΩT in which the buyer’s action differs from the action the seller
would take if he controlled the asset in the same state.
Note that Proposition 3 is also a corollary of Milgrom and Stokey’s main result.
Proposition 3 says that trade is associated with a change in action. Two possible
applications include the role of vulture investors in debt restructuring, and corporate
raiders. With regard to the former, it is widely perceived that vulture investors’
behavior in restructuring negotiations differs from that of the original creditors (see,
e.g., Morris 2002). With regard to the latter, there is evidence that large scale layoffs
and divestitures follow takeovers (see, e.g., Bhagat et al 1990).
A second implication of inequality (5) is that as the seller’s information becomes
infinitely accurate the probability of trade converges to zero.

The reason is that

as the seller’s information quality grows his own signal almost perfectly reveals the
fundamental θ in most states, and so the seller takes the full-information optimal
action.

This effectively eliminates the gains from trade.

Since the direct costs

of trade are fixed by the parameter δ, the probability of trade must approach zero.
16

Formally, the seller’s signal is high quality if the likelihood ratio L1 of the signal is
either very low or very high with high probability:
Proposition 4. Consider a sequence of economies, indexed by n, that are identical
apart from the conditional distribution of the seller’s signal, η θ1(n) , along with a corresponding sequence of ex post IR trade sets ΩT(n) . Suppose the quality of the seller’s
signal becomes arbitrarily good as n → ∞, in the sense that for any ε > 0 and θ = a, b
ηθ1(n)



s1 : L1(n) (s1 ) ∈ [ε, 1/ε] → 0.



Then the probability of trade converges to zero, i.e., µ ΩT(n) → 0.
Similar to Proposition 4, one can show that if the buyer’s signal becomes arbitrarily uninformative then the probability of trade likewise converges to zero.
Recall that Proposition 2 says that the buyer must learn something about the
realization of the seller’s signal if trade is to occur. However, the buyer must have
information of his own to complement information he acquires from the seller. That
is, if instead the seller’s information is much more informative than the buyer’s, the
buyer’s information adds almost nothing and the above observations imply that the
probability of trade is very low.

4

Sufficient conditions for trade

Proposition 1 establishes that trade is possible only if the asset value V is nonmonotone in the probability of fundamental a. Whether this condition is also sufficient
to generate trade depends, in part, on the trading mechanism used. In this section
we show that non-monotonicity of V is sufficient for trade in at least some trading
mechanisms. We do so using a constructive proof for arguably the simplest mechanism
possible: (1) a non-strategic third-party — a “broker” — sets a price p, and then (2)
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the buyer and seller simultaneously and publicly announce whether they wish to trade
at price p.
Proposition 5. Suppose V is non-monotone and the third-party posted price mechanism is used. Choose any price p ∈ (min V, min {V (0) , V (1)} − δ). There exists
an equilibrium of the following form: the seller offers to sell when he sees a signal
s1 ∈ S1T ≡ [s1 , s̄1], and the buyer offers to buy if he sees a signal s2 ∈ S2T ≡ R\ (s2 , s̄2).
The ex post IR constraints are satisfied in equilibrium.
Together, Propositions 1 and 5 establish that non-monotonicity of V is both necessary and sufficient for trade.
In the equilibrium of Proposition 5, the buyer offers to buy whenever his signal is
either high or low, that is, when it is relatively informative of the fundamental. Given
that V is non-monotone and single-troughed (see Figure 1), the buyer’s valuation of
the asset is relatively high at such signals. Similarly, the seller offers to sell when he
sees an intermediate signal, that is, a signal that is relatively uninformative about
the fundamental. Given the shape of V the seller’s valuation is relatively low at such
signals.
In equilibrium, trade transfers control of the asset from an agent who has received
an uninformative signal to one who has received an informative signal.

Moreover,

because of its contingent nature trade also reveals information about the agents’
signals to each other. Specifically, when the seller retains the asset he learns whether
or not the buyer’s signal is in S2T ; and when the buyer acquires the asset, he learns
that the seller’s signal is in S1T .
Proposition 5 establishes the existence of a continuum of equilibria, indexed by
the trade price p. Comparing the lowest price p = min V to the highest price p =
min {V (0) , V (1)}−δ, the buyer’s demand (i.e., the probability of accepting the price)
decreases (from 1 to 0), while the seller’s supply increases (from 0 to 1). That is, the
comparative static across equilibria generates an downwards sloping demand curve
18

and an upwards sloping supply curve.15
An important implication of the no-trade theorems established in the existing
literature is that economic agents would not spend resources to acquire information.
In contrast, our next result shows that this is not true in our model.16 The key reason
is, of course, that information is valuable. The non-trivial aspect of the result consists
of showing that an agent’s information is valuable above-and-beyond the information
he acquires from the other agent in the course of trade.
Proposition 6. Suppose the buyer and seller must each incur a cost k > 0 in order
to observe their signals. Fix any price p ∈ (min V, min {V (0) , V (1)} − δ). Provided
the information acquisition cost k is sufficiently small there exists an equilibrium of
the third-party posted price mechanism in which both the buyer and seller acquire their
signals and trade occurs with positive probability.
Alternate mechanisms
The third-party posted price mechanism we considered above describes many trading
environments well. For example, both buyers and sellers take the price as exogenous
when they submit market orders; in upstairs trades, in which the upstairs broker
proposes the price; and in crossing networks (POSIT is a well-known example) in
which the price is determined elsewhere.17
15

Because of the interdependency between the buyer and seller, more conditions would be required

to establish that the demand (respectively, supply) curve is monotonically downwards (respectively,
upwards) sloping.
16
See, for example, Berk (1997) and Jackson and Peck (1999) for models in which agents pay to
acquire a costly signal even in the absence of exogenous noise.
17
In the third-party posted price mechanism, we also assumed that the offers to buy and sell
are public. The reason we make this assumption is so that the equilibrium conditions from the
mechanism coincide with our ex post IR conditions. In practice, the seller clearly learns whether the
buyer offers to buy if he offers to sell. Likewise, the buyer learns whether the seller offers to sell if
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Nonetheless, in at least some situations it is the trading parties themselves who set
the price. We have also analyzed trade possibilities in one such mechanism, in which
(1) the buyer proposes a price p ∈ P , where P is finite set of possible offers,18 and (2)
the seller accepts or rejects. We establish that trade in this mechanism is necessarily
more complicated than in the third-party posted price mechanism. Specifically, if
trade takes place, it must do so at a price that partially depends on the buyer’s
signal s2 . However, our main conclusion — that trade is possible even absent noise
traders — remains valid. Details are available in an appendix posted on the authors’
webpages.

5

Portfolio selection

In our basic model agents choose an action that directly affects the payoff produced
by the asset. Clearly in many circumstances agents trade assets over which they have
little or no direct control. Even in such settings, however, an agent who owns an
asset must still decide how to allocate the remainder of his portfolio, and if the agent
is risk averse this decision affects the agent’s utility from holding the asset. When
agents are unsure about how asset returns are distributed, gains from trade arise for
the same reasons as in our basic model, as we now demonstrate.
In order to remain close to our basic model, we adopt what is essentially a partial
equilibrium approach: we consider a many-investor economy with a risk free security
he offers to buy. It is irrelevant what the buyer learns if he does not offer to buy. As such, the
only remaining question is whether the seller learns whether the buyer offers to buy if he does not
offer to sell. For many upstairs trades it is reasonable to suppose that the seller learns the buyer’s
announcement when he does not offer to sell. That is, for many stocks only a few individuals hold a
large block, and so the holder of a block learns whether or not there is buying interest from whether
or not an upstairs broker contacts him.
18
The assumption that the offer set P is finite ensures that the action set is finite. As is wellknown, equilibrium existence is not guaranteed in games with infinite action spaces.
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and n + 1 risky securities, and consider when information-based trade of just one of
these securities — security 1 — occurs. Accordingly, we assume that the fundamental
θ has no effect on how an investor without security 1 would choose to allocate his
wealth across the risk free security and securities 2, . . . , n + 1.19 We then endow a
single investor, agent 1, with security 1. From our analysis of necessary conditions for
trade, we know that the only potential buyers of security 1 are investors who observe
an informative signal about the fundamental θ. To keep our analysis close to the basic
model we assume there is just one such investor, agent 2.20 We analyze under what
conditions agent 2 buys security 1 from agent 1 — that is, when information-based
trade of security 1 occurs. (We assume for now that security 1 is indivisible, and
return to this point in the conclusion.)
All investors in the economy are free to take any position in the risk free security,
and any position ψ ∈ Ψ ⊂ Rn in securities 2, . . . , n + 1. Importantly, agents 1 and 2
are free to rebalance their portfolios after they trade (or do not trade) security 1.21
All investors have a common utility function u. The initial wealth of agents 1
and 2 is W1 and W2 respectively. As in the basic model, we typically refer to agent
1 as the seller and agent 2 as the buyer. We normalize both the return on the risk
free security and the price of each risky security 2, . . . , n + 1 to unity. We denote the
payoff of security 1 by R, and the vector of excess returns (over the risk free security)
of securities 2, . . . , n + 1 by r. Both R and r are stochastic, with distributions that
potentially differ across fundamentals a and b.22
19

This assumption implies that aggregate demands for the risk free security and securities

2, . . . , n + 1 are independent of perceptions about the fundamental.

Hence the prices of these

securities are likewise independent of perceptions about the fundamental.
20
Allowing for multiple buyers would not fundamentally change our analysis.
21
By footnote 19, the prices of the risk free security and securities 2, . . . , n + 1 are unaffected by
investors’ beliefs about what agents 1 and 2 have observed.
22
If the distribution of r differs across fundamentals a and b, it does so in a way that leaves the
optimal portfolio allocation of any investor without security 1 unchanged.

21

The expected utility of an agent with wealth W who owns security 1 and believes
that the probability of fundamental a is q is given by
U (W, q) ≡ max E [u (W + R + rψ) |q] .
ψ∈Ψ

Likewise, the expected utility of an agent who does not own security 1 is
Ū (W, q) ≡ max E [u (W + rψ) |q] .
ψ∈Ψ

For use below, note that U is convex in q (the argument is the same as for Lemma
1); while Ū is linear in q because by assumption the fundamental θ has no effect on
portfolio choice of an agent without security 1.
Exactly as in our basic model, an allocation is described by the pair of mappings
κ and π. We continue to assume a small cost δ is associated with trading security 1.
Analogous to before, the ex post IR conditions are
Ū (W1 + π (ω) , Q (ω; F1κ,π )) ≥ U (W1 , Q (ω; F1κ,π ))
U (W2 − π (ω) − δ, Q (ω; F2κ,π )) ≥ Ū (W2 , Q (ω; F2κ,π ))
in almost all states in which the buyer gets the security (i.e., ω such that κ (ω) = 2),
and
U (W1 + π (ω) , Q (ω; F1κ,π )) ≥ U (W1 , Q (ω; F1κ,π ))
Ū (W2 − π (ω) , Q (ω; F2κ,π )) ≥ Ū (W2 , Q (ω; F2κ,π ))
in almost all states in which the seller keeps the security (i.e., ω such that κ (ω) = 1).
Note that exactly as in the basic model, this second pair of inequalities implies that
π (ω) = 0 for almost all states in which the seller keeps the security.
One complication of this framework relative to our basic model is that wealth
effects may lead the buyer and seller to choose different portfolios, even if they have
exactly the same information.23 In contrast, in our basic model agents with the same
23

Even if W1 = W2 , so that the two agents have the same initial wealth, the buyer’s wealth when

he acquires the security is lower.
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information always choose the same action. To avoid this complication we assume
that both agents share the same constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility,
u (x) = −e−γx , where γ > 0. In this case, there exist negative-valued functions v and
v̄ such that U (W, q) = e−γW v (q) and Ū (W, q) = e−γW v̄ (q). After substitution, the
ex post IR conditions for states in which the buyer gets the security become
e

−γπ(ω)

v (Q (ω; F1κ,π ))
≤
v̄ (Q (ω; F1κ,π ))

v (Q (ω; F2κ,π ))
≤ e−γ(π(ω)+δ) .
v̄ (Q (ω; F2κ,π ))

Taking logs and defining V ≡ − γ1 ln v̄v generates precisely equations (3) and (4), with
V replaced by V. Because U is convex in q and Ū is linear in q, V is single-troughed,
just as V is (see Lemma 1).24 Consequently our prior analysis applies, and trade is
possible if and only if V is non-monotone. Writing ψ θ for the optimal portfolio of an
agent who holds security 1 and knows the fundamental is θ, and ψ̄ for the optimal
portfolio of an agent without security 1, we have:
Proposition 7. Trade in security 1 is possible if and only if V, or equivalently v/v̄,
is non-monotone. This condition is satisfied if and only if
h
i


 −γ(rψ +R) 
−γr ψ̄
E
−e
|a
b
E −e−γ(rψa +R) |a
E −e
|a
>  −γrψ̄  >
.
E [−e−γ(rψ b+R) |b]
E [−e−γ(rψ a+R) |b]
E −e
|b

(6)

An immediate implication of Proposition 7 is that trade is possible only if ψa 6= ψb ,

i.e., the fundamental actually affects the portfolio decision of an agent holding security
1.
Trade and CAPM betas
For the remainder of this section we assume that returns are normally distributed.
Notationally, write µθ for the 1 × n vector of mean returns for securities 2, . . . , n + 1
24

The details of this argument are in the proof of Proposition 7.
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in fundamental θ, and Σθ for the corresponding variance-covariance matrix.

The

optimal portfolio of an agent without security 1 is thus25,26
0
ψ̄ = γ −1 Σ−1
θ µθ .

Likewise, let ν θ and ζ 2θ denote the mean and variance of the payoff of security 1 in
fundamental θ, with Σ1θ the 1 × n covariance vector of security 1 with securities
2, . . . , n + 1. Hence an investor with security 1 who knows θ chooses the portfolio
ψθ = ψ̄ − β θ ,
0
where β θ = Σ−1
θ Σ1θ . That is, an agent with security 1 picks a portfolio that combines

the position he would choose if he did not own security 1, ψ̄, with the varianceminimizing hedge of that security, −β θ .
Consequently, trade is possible only if β a 6= β b .

Moreover, if n = 2 so that

there is just one risky security — the “market” — β θ is simply the CAPM beta in
fundamental θ. In this case, trade is possible only if the CAPM beta of security 1
differs across fundamentals.
Volatility and volume
Empirically, stock return volatility and trading volume are positively correlated, both
at an aggregate level and at the level of individual stocks.27 Our framework easily
25

To ensure that the portfolio allocation of an investor without security 1 is independent of fun-

−1 0
0
damental θ, we assume Σ−1
a µa = Σb µb .
26
The expressions for ψ̄ and ψ θ are standard; they can also be easily derived by differentiating

equation (21) in the appendix.
27
See, e.g., the survey by Karpoff (1987). The typical study in this literature relates volume to
volatility measured over a trailing window.

Our model predicts correlation between volume and

perceived future volatility. To the extent to which volatility is persistent the two correlations will
be similar.

Moreover, implied aggregate volatility from options markets is also correlated with

aggregate volume (details are available upon request from the authors).
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delivers just such a positive correlation, as the following simple parameterization
makes clear.
Assume that the only impact of the fundamental is on the volatility of security
1, i.e., ζ a = ζ − ε and ζ b = ζ + ε for some ζ and ε ∈ (0, ζ). Thus (provided
the unconditional probabilities of fundamentals a and b are approximately equal) an
increase in ε increases the unconditional variance of security 1. All other properties of
return distributions are unaffected by the fundamental: µθ , Σθ , ν θ , and the correlation
of security 1 with other securities, are equal across fundamentals θ = a, b. Finally,
assume that security 1 is positively correlated with the other securities.
A straightforward application of Proposition 7 (see appendix for details) implies
that ex post IR trade of security 1 is possible if and only if ε is sufficiently large.28
Intuitively, the difference in the volatility of security 1 across fundamentals affects
the optimal hedge for that security. When this effect is big enough, a seller with
an uninformative signal realization is unable to hedge security 1 effectively. There is
then a gain to trading the asset to the buyer if the latter has seen a more informative
signal, and is thus in a better position to incorporate security 1 into his portfolio.
Because both the unconditional volatility of security 1 and trade volume are increasing in ε, this parameterization matches the empirical observation that the two
quantities are positively correlated.

6

Conclusion

In this paper we have shown that if asset payoffs are endogenously determined by
the actions of agents, then trade based purely on informational differences is possible.
This conclusion stands in sharp contrast to the existing literature, which takes asset
values as exogenous. Trade transfers control of the asset from an agent who has
28

We assume here that the distributions or r and R are such that trade is possible at ε = ζ.
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received an uninformative signal to one who has received an informative signal. Even
without the presence of noise traders, agents in our model would be prepared to
spend resources to acquire information; and this information is subsequently partially
revealed by trade.
Our analysis generates a number of empirical implications. One general implication is that trade affects the action taken: when the buyer acquires the asset, he
(at least sometimes) takes an action that is different from the one the seller would
have taken. As we discussed, this implication is consistent with both firm policy after
takeovers and with different creditor behaviors in debt restructuring, though other
explanations are certainly possible. Other implications depend more on the specific
application. In particular, the application of our model to the trade of non-controlling
shares implies that trade volume may increase with volatility.
Clearly many avenues for future research exist. A fuller analysis of price negotiation between the buyer and seller is one important topic. Another is the extension
of our portfolio allocation application. In particular, we currently assume that security 1 is indivisible, which ensures that a single agent holds security 1 in any Pareto
optimal allocation. If instead security 1 were divisible the Pareto optimal allocation
would generally entail multiple agents holding a strictly positive quantity of security
1. Analyzing such a framework would allow one to move beyond establishing the
possibility of trade, as we do here, and to address the quantity and direction of trade.
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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1: Without loss, suppose V is weakly increasing, and suppose
that contrary to the claimed result the set trade set ΩT is non-null. Let P be the set
of prices at which trade occurs, and for each p ∈ P let ΩT (p) be the subset in which
trade occurs at price p and the ex post IR conditions hold, so ΩT = ∪p∈P ΩT (p).
We claim that for some p ∈ P there exists ω ∗ ∈ ΩT (p) such that Q (ω ∗ ; F2κ,π ) ≤
Q (ω ∗ ; F1κ,π ). Since V is weakly increasing, this claim implies that
V (Q (ω ∗ ; F2κ,π )) ≤ V (Q (ω ∗ ; F1κ,π )) .
However, ex post IR implies
V (Q (ω ∗; F1κ,π )) ≤ p < p + δ ≤ V (Q (ω ∗ ; F2κ,π )) ,
giving the required contradiction.
To prove the claim, suppose to the contrary that Q (ω; F1κ,π ) < Q (ω; F2κ,π ) for all
p ∈ P and ω ∈ ΩT (p). By the definition of conditional probability, for i = 1, 2,
Z

Q (ω; Fiκ,π ) µ (dω) = µ ΩT ∩ {a} × R2 ,
ΩT

and so

Z

ΩT

(Q (ω; F2κ,π ) − Q (ω; F1κ,π )) µ (dω) = 0.
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This gives a contradiction, since by supposition Q (ω; F2κ,π ) − Q (ω; F1κ,π ) > 0 and ΩT
has strictly positive measure.
Proof of Proposition 2: We establish Proposition 2 by contradiction. Suppose to
the contrary that an ex post IR trade (κ, π) exists in which the buyer learns nothing

whenever he acquires the asset. That is, trade occurs over ΩT , where µ ΩT > 0,


and F ∩ ΩT : F ∈ F2κ,π = F ∩ ΩT : F ∈ F2 .

Choose an integer n such that ΩTn ≡ ΩT ∩{a, b}×R×[n, n + 1] has strictly positive

mass. Since the buyer learns nothing when he acquires the asset, Q ((θ, s1, s2 ) ; F2κ,π ) =
Q ((θ, s1, s2 ) ; F2 ) = Pr (a|s2) for all (θ, s1, s2 ) ∈ ΩT . Let q = Pr (a|s2 = n) and
 
q̄ = Pr (a|s2 = n + 1), so that Q (ω; F2κ,π ) ∈ q, q̄ for ω ∈ ΩTn .
We claim that

inf Q (ω; F1κ,π ) < q < q̄ < sup Q (ω; F1κ,π ) .

ω∈ΩT
n

(7)

ω∈ΩT
n

This implies the result, as follows. Ex post IR for the buyer and single-troughedness
of V (see Lemma 1) together imply that


π (ω) ≤ V (Q (ω; F2κ,π )) − δ ≤ max V q , V (q̄) − δ

for all ω ∈ ΩTn . Single-troughedness of V and (7) imply that
( 
!)



κ,π
κ,π
max V inf Q (ω; F1 ) , V sup Q (ω; F1 )
≥ max V q , V (q̄) .
ω∈ΩT
n

ω∈ΩT
n

But then since V is continuous there must exist ω ∈ ΩTn such that V (Q (ω; F1κ,π )) >
π (ω), contradicting ex post IR for the seller.
To complete the proof we must establish (7).

Suppose that contrary to (7),

inf ω∈ΩTn Q (ω; F1κ,π ) ≥ q. From the definition of conditional probability, for any s1
Z

Q (ω; F1κ,π ) µ (dω) = µ ΩT ∩ ({a} × (−∞, s1) × R) .
ΩT ∩({a,b}×(−∞,s1 )×R)
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Since ΩTn ⊂ ΩT and by supposition Q (ω; F1κ,π ) ≥ q over ΩTn ,
Z
Q (ω; F1κ,π ) µ (dω)
ΩT ∩({a,b}×(−∞,s1 )×R)
Z
≥
Q (ω; F1κ,π ) µ (dω)
ΩT
n ∩({a,b}×(−∞,s1 )×R)


≥ qµ ΩTn ∩ ({a, b} × (−∞, s1 ) × R) .

So


µ ΩT ∩ ({a} × (−∞, s1) × R)
q≤
.
µ (ΩTn ∩ ({a, b} × (−∞, s1 ) × R))

Since after trade the buyer learns nothing, ΩT ∈ F2 and so is of the form {a, b} ×


R × S2T , where S2T ∈ B. Note that ηθ1 S2T and η θ1 S2T ∩ [n, n + 1] are both strictly

positive for θ = a, b, since µ ΩT > 0. So the last inequality rewrites to

Pr (a) F1a (s1 ) η a1 S2T
.
q≤
Pr (a) F1a (s1) ηa1 (S2T ∩ [n, n + 1]) + Pr (b) F1b (s1 ) η b1 (S2T ∩ [n, n + 1])
But since the likelihood ratio is unbounded (see (1)) the righthand side converges to
0 as s1 → −∞, giving a contradiction and thus showing inf ω∈ΩTn Q (ω; F1κ,π ) < q. A
parallel argument implies q̄ < supω∈ΩTn Q (ω; F1κ,π ) , completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose to the contrary that for almost all ω ∈ ΩT the
buyer takes the same action the seller would take if he controls the asset in state ω.
Then V (Q (ω; F2κ,π )) = V (Q (ω; F1κ,π )) for almost all ω ∈ ΩT , which violates (5) and
gives a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4:

Recall that if an agent has information given by the

σ-algebra F he knows the true realization of the fundamental. As such,
Z
Z
κ,π
(V (Q (ω; F2 ))) µ (dω) ≤
(V (Q (ω; F ))) µ (dω) ,
ΩT

ΩT

i.e., the buyer’s valuation of asset is less than the value of the asset to a perfectly
informed agent. Moreover, since the seller’s information becomes arbitrarily good,
Z
Z
κ,π
(V (Q (ω; F1 ))) µ (dω) →
(V (Q (ω; F ))) µ (dω) .
ΩT

ΩT
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It follows that the limit supremum of the lefthand side of (5) is weakly negative,
giving the result.
Proof of Proposition 5:

We start with some preliminaries. Recall that Li (si )

denotes the likelihood ratio of signal si ; likewise, for any set S such that η ai (S) > 0,
we let Li (S) denote the likelihood ratio η ai (S) /η bi (S). The asset value V is defined
as a function of q, the probability the asset holder attaches to fundamental a. In the
trade equilibria under consideration, for the seller the conditional probability q is of


the form Pr a|s1, s2 ∈
/ S2T , while for the buyer it is of the form Pr a|s1 ∈ S1T , s2 .
It is convenient to rewrite these probabilities as
Pr a|s1, s2 ∈
/

Pr a|s1 ∈

S2T

S1T , s2



=

Pr(a)
L (s1 ) L2 R\S2T
Pr(b) 1
Pr(a)
L (s1 ) L2 (R\S2T ) +
Pr(b) 1



=

Pr(a)
L S1 L2 (s2 )
Pr(b) 1
Pr(a)
L (S1T ) L2 (s2 ) +
Pr(b) 1




T

1

1

.

Next, define a mapping from likelihood ratios to probabilities by
q (L) ≡

Pr(a)
L
Pr(b)
Pr(a)
L+
Pr(b)

1

for any L ∈ [0, ∞),

along with a transformation V ` of V that takes a likelihood ratio L as its argument,
i.e., V ` ≡ V ◦ q. The function V is single-troughed (Lemma 1), and by hypothesis
is non-monotone. As such, there exist probabilities q ∗ and q ∗∗ ≥ q ∗ such that V is
strictly decreasing over [0, q ∗], flat over [q ∗, q ∗∗], and strictly increasing over [q ∗∗, 1].
Since q is strictly increasing in L, L∗ = q −1 (q ∗) and L∗∗ = q −1 (q ∗∗) are well-defined,
and V ` is strictly decreasing over [0, L∗ ], flat over [L∗ , L∗∗], and strictly increasing
over [L∗∗, ∞).
We show there exists an equilibrium of the type described, i.e., S1T ≡ [s1, s̄1 ] and
S2T ≡ R\ (s2 , s̄2).

If the seller sees signal s1 his payoff from offering to sell is




Pr s2 ∈ S2T |s1 p + Pr s2 ∈
/ S2T |s1 V ` L1 (s1 ) L2 R\S2T ,
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while his payoff from not offering to sell is




Pr s2 ∈ S2T |s1 V ` L1 (s1) L2 S2T + Pr s2 ∈
/ S2T |s1 V ` L1 (s1) L2 R\S2T .

Thus it is a best response for the seller to offer to sell whenever s1 ∈ S1T if and only if
V ` L1 (s1 ) L2 S2T
V ` L1 (s1 ) L2 S2T





≤ p for all s1 ∈ S1T
≥ p for all s1 ∈
/ S1T .

By continuity and the shape of V ` , these conditions are satisfied if and only if
V ` L1 (s1 ) L2 S2T



= V ` L1 (s̄1 ) L2 S2T



= p.

(8)

Likewise, in order for the buyer to offer to buy whenever s2 ∈ S2T ,


V ` L1 S1T L2 (s2 ) − δ ≥ p for all s2 ∈ S2T


V ` L1 S1T L2 (s2 ) − δ ≤ p for all s2 ∈
/ S2T ,

and these conditions are satisfied if and only if





V ` L1 S1T L2 (s2) − δ = V ` L1 S1T L2 (s̄2) − δ = p.

(9)

Thus a trade equilibrium exists if and only if there exist s1 , s̄1 6= s1, s2 , s̄2 6= s2 such
that (8) and (9) hold.
From the shape of V ` , there exists a unique quadruple L1 , L̄1 , L2, L̄2 such that
Li < L∗ ≤ L∗∗ < L̄i for i = 1, 2, and

V ` (L1 ) = V ` L̄1 = p

V ` (L2 ) − δ = V ` L̄2 − δ = p.

Consequently, a trade equilibrium of the type described exists if and only if there
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exist s1 , s̄1 6= s1 , s2, s̄2 6= s2 satisfying the following system of four equations:
L1 (s1 ) L2 (R\ (s2 , s̄2 )) = L1

(10)

L1 (s̄1 ) L2 (R\ (s2 , s̄2 )) = L̄1

(11)

L1 ([s1 , s̄1]) L2 (s2 ) = L2

(12)

L1 ([s1 , s̄1]) L2 (s̄2 ) = L̄2 .

(13)

To complete the proof we show that such a quadruple does exist.

First note that

(10) and (11) imply
L1 (s1 )
L
= 1 <1
L1 (s̄1 )
L̄1

(14)

L2 (s2 )
L
= 2 < 1.
L2 (s̄2 )
L̄2

(15)

and (12) and (13) imply

Fix s1 and solve for s̄1(s1 ) > s1 from (14). Similarly solve for s̄2 (s2) > s2 from (15).
Substituting for s̄1 (s1) and s̄2 (s2 ), rewrite (10) and (12) as
L1 (s1 ) L2 (R\ (s2 , s̄2(s2 ))) = L1

(16)

L1 ([s1, s̄1 (s1 )]) L2 (s2 ) = L2.

(17)

Observe that s̄1 (s1) → ±∞ as s1 → ±∞. Consequently L1 ([s1 , s̄1(s1 )]) → ∞ as
s1 → ∞ and L1([s1 , s̄1(s1 )]) → 0 as s1 → −∞. Thus from (17) define s2 (s1 ), and
note that s2 (s1 ) → ∓∞ as s1 → ±∞.
Also observe that s̄2 (s2 ) → ±∞ as s2 → ±∞, and so L2 (R\ (s2, s̄2 )) → 1 as
s2 → ±∞. So substituting in for s2 (s1), the lefthand side of (16) approaches 0 as
s1 → −∞ and grows without bound as s1 → ∞. By continuity it follows that there
exists some s1 such that

completing the proof.



L1 (s1 ) L2 (R\ s2 s1 , s̄2(s2 (s1 )) ) = L1,
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Proof of Proposition 6: The key to the proof is the following observation: for
any set S2 ⊂ R, Jensen’s inequality, the convexity and non-monotonicty of V , and
unbounded MLRP together imply
E [V (Pr (a| {s1 } × S2 )) |s2 ∈ S2 ]
Z ∞
X
=
Pr (θ|s2 ∈ S2 )
V (Pr (a| {s1} × S2 )) f1θ (s1 ) ds1
θ=a,b

>

X

−∞

Pr (θ|s2 ∈ S2 ) V (Pr (a|S2)) = V (Pr (a|S2)) .

θ=a,b

Likewise, for any S1 ⊂ R, E [V (Pr (a|S1 × {s2 })) |s1 ∈ S1 ] > V (Pr (a|S1)).
We show that the equilibrium established in Proposition 5 remains an equilibrium
when the buyer and seller must pay k to acquire their signals. For an information
acquisition cost of k = 0, the seller’s equilibrium utility is

p Pr s1 ∈ S1T , s2 ∈ S2T




+E V Pr a| {s1 } × S2T |s1 ∈
/ S1T , s2 ∈ S2T Pr s1 ∈
/ S1T , s2 ∈ S2T



+E V Pr a| {s1 } × R\S2T
Pr s2 ∈
/ S2T .

(18)

Because the seller could instead always offer to sell, this quantity exceeds






p Pr s2 ∈ S2T + E V Pr a| {s1 } × R\S2T |s2 ∈
/ S2T Pr s2 ∈
/ S2T ,

which by above is in turn strictly greater than




p Pr s2 ∈ S2T + V Pr a|R\S2T Pr s2 ∈
/ S2T .

This last expression equals the seller’s payoff under the deviation in which he does
not buy his signal and always trades. Similarly, the seller’s equilibrium utility (18)
is greater than his payoff from never trading,




E V Pr a| {s1} × S2T |s2 ∈ S2T Pr s2 ∈ S2T




+E V Pr a| {s1 } × R\S2T |s2 ∈
/ S2T Pr s2 ∈
/ S2T
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which is in turn strictly greater than
V Pr a|S2T






Pr s2 ∈ S2T + V Pr a|R\S2T Pr s2 ∈
/ S2T ,

the value of the asset to the seller if he observes only the buyer’s announcement of
whether or not he is prepared to buy. So for all information acquisition costs k that
are sufficiently low the seller chooses to buy his information.
For an information acquisition cost of k = 0, the buyer’s equilibrium utility is




E V Pr a|S1T × {s2 } − p − δ|s1 ∈ S1T , s2 ∈ S2T Pr s1 ∈ S1T , s2 ∈ S2T .

Because the buyer could instead always offer to buy, this exceeds





E V Pr a|S1T × {s2} − p − δ|s1 ∈ S1T Pr S1T ,

which in turn strictly exceeds

V Pr a|S1T





− p − δ Pr S1T ,

the buyer’s payoff under the deviation in which he does not buy his signal and always
trades. Finally, if the buyer deviates to not buying the signal and never trading, his
payoff is simply zero, and which is strictly less than his equilibrium utility. Again,
for all information acquisition costs k that are sufficiently low the buyer chooses to
buy his information.
Proof of Proposition 7:

We first show that trade is possible if and only if V is

non-monotone. As discussed in the main text, given prior results we need only show
that V is single-troughed, or equivalently, v/v̄ is single-peaked. The derivative of v/v̄
has the same sign as
v 0 (q) v̄ (q) − v (q) v̄ 0 (q) .
The derivative of (19) in turn equals v 00 (q) v̄ (q) − v (q) v̄ 00 (q).

(19)
Recall that by as-

sumption the optimal portfolio allocation of an agent without security 1 is unaffected
36

by the fundamental. Consequently, Ū and hence v̄ are linear in q. So the derivative of (19) is simply v 00 (q) v̄ (q), which is weakly negative since v is convex and v̄ is
negative-valued.

It follows that v/v̄ is either monotone, or else is increasing then

decreasing. This completes the first half of the proof.
Second, we establish (6). Given that v/v̄ is single-peaked, it is non-monotone if
and only if
∂
∂q



v (q)
v̄ (q)



q=0

∂
>0>
∂q



v (q)
v̄ (q)



.
q=1

Consequently, trade is possible if and only if
v 0 (0) v̄ (0) − v (0) v̄ 0 (0) > 0 > v 0 (1) v̄ (1) − v (1) v̄ 0 (1) .

(20)

Letting ψ (q) be the optimal market allocation of an investor who holds security 1
and attaches a probability q to fundamental a,




v (q) = qE −e−γ(rψ(q)+R) |a + (1 − q) E −e−γ(rψ(q)+R) |b ,

with a similar expression for v̄ (q). Straightforward algebra and the envelope theorem
together imply that v 0 (0) v̄ (0) − v (0) v̄ 0 (0) equals
 −γ(rψ +R)  h −γrψ̄ i
 −γ(rψ +R)  h −γrψ̄ i
b
b
E −e
|a E −e
|b − E −e
|b E −e
|a ,

while v 0 (1) v̄ (1) − v (1) v̄ 0 (1) equals

i
i

 h

 h
E −e−γ(rψa +R) |a E −e−γrψ̄ |b − E −e−γ(rψa +R) |b E −e−γrψ̄ |a .

Substitution into (20) implies that trade is possible if and only if (6) holds.

Details for the volatility-volume parameterization (see page 25): In the
CARA-normal framework, the utility of an agent holding security 1 and portfolio ψ
in fundamental θ is given by



γ 0
ψ Σψ + ζ 2θ + 2Σ1θ ψ
.
− exp −γ µθ ψ + ν θ −
2
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(21)

Since the correlation of security 1 with the other securities is independent of θ, and
positive, there exists some constant positive vector K such that Σ1θ = ζ θ K. Substitution into (6) implies that trade is possible if and only if




ζ 2a + 2ζ a Kψ b − ζ 2b + 2ζ b Kψ b > 0 > ζ 2a + 2ζ a Kψ a − ζ 2b + 2ζ b Kψa ,

or equivalently,

−2Kψ b > ζ a + ζ b > −2Kψ a .
Substituting in for ζ θ and ψ θ , this condition is in turn equivalent to
0
−1 0
−K ψ̄ + (ζ + ε) KΣ−1
θ K > ζ > −K ψ̄ + (ζ − ε) KΣθ K .
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